He was able to return to the missile problem only as his advisers gathered in the Cabinet Room at 6:30. House, McNamara and Gilpatric worked out an outline of three alternative courses of action, which McNamara would present at the meeting.įrom 4:00 on, Kennedy himself had been occupied with his regular schedule. In the last 40 minutes before returning to the White They have since been declassified and are available from the National Security Archive, in Washington, D.C. The notes were made in 1976 before these transcripts were apparently destroyed. Based on notes taken from transcripts of JCS meetings in October–November 1962. After McNamara left, the JCS agreed that they did not favor use of low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba, fearing that they would “tip our hand.” They also agreed they would rather do nothing than limit an air strike only to MRBMs. They nevertheless approved several prudential steps to increase U.S. Presuming that the Soviets would not initiate a nuclear war against the United States, the JCS favored an attack, regardless of whether the missiles were operational. After discussing the possibility of having Cuban émigrés attack the missile sites, he and the rest of the group seemed to agree this was not feasible.Īt the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with CINCLANT, the commanders of SAC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC), and the general commanding the 18th Airborne Corps. He wondered aloud how many Cubans would defend Castro’s regime if the country were invaded. Pressed by the CIA representative (Richard Helms) to explain the ultimate objective of the operation and what to promise the Cuban exiles, Robert Kennedy hinted the President might be becoming less averse to overt U.S. Describing the “general dissatisfaction” of the President with progress thus far, the Attorney General focused discussion on a new and more active program of sabotage that had just been prepared by the CIA. So did Soviet experts Bohlen and Thompson and the assistant secretary for Latin America, Edwin Martin.Īt Justice, Robert Kennedy had meanwhile held in his own office a meeting of those involved in Operation Mongoose. Showing Stevenson the U-2 photos, Kennedy said, “I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and wipe them out or to take other steps to render the weapons inoperable.” Stevenson’s position was: “Let’s not go into an air strike until we have explored the possibilities of a peaceful solution.”ĭuring the afternoon, Stevenson took part in the meetings at the State Department. After lunch, Kennedy invited Stevenson to the family quarters. He presided over a formal lunch for the crown prince of Libya. While this went on, Kennedy kept to his announced schedule. Rusk and others at State would study how theĪdministration could act promptly and effectively against the missiles without surprising allies in the hemisphere and Europe and possibly losing their support. The morning meeting had ended with an understanding that the Pentagon team would analyze possibilities for a quick air strike, possibly followed by an invasion. Edited by Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, with David Coleman, George Eliades, Francis Gavin, Jill Colley Kastner, Erin Mahan, Ernest May, Jonathan Rosenberg, David Shreve, and Patricia Dunn
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